Digest: Spielbauer v. County of Santa Clara by Khajebag, Katayon
Chapman Law Review
Volume 13 | Issue 2 Article 11
2010
Digest: Spielbauer v. County of Santa Clara
Katayon Khajebag
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chapman Law Review by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Katayon Khajebag, Digest: Spielbauer v. County of Santa Clara, 13 Chap. L. Rev. 457 (2010).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol13/iss2/11
Do Not Delete 5/10/2010 12:28 PM 
457 
Digest:  Spielbauer v. County of Santa Clara  
Katayon Khajebag 
Opinion by Baxter, J., expressing the unanimous view of the 
court. 
Issue 
Is a public employer required to offer formal immunity from 
the use of incriminating statements in response to an employee’s 
invocation of his or her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination before it can dismiss the employee for refusing to 
answer questions in connection with its investigation? 
Facts 
In January 2003, a Santa Clara deputy public defender 
(“plaintiff”) represented Michael Dignan on charges of 
ammunition possession by a felon.1  Dignan was arrested with 
Troy Boyd, his roommate.2  As part of the defense strategy, 
plaintiff sought to introduce Boyd’s statement to the police that 
his parents owned the house where the ammunition was located.  
Boyd also stated that he was renting the home from his parents 
at the time of the arrest.  Plaintiff hoped that this testimony 
would create reasonable doubt as to whether Dignan had control 
of the area in which the ammunition was found.3  However, Boyd 
testified he had sublet portions of the home to other people in the 
past, including Dignan.4  When the prosecutor moved to exclude 
Boyd’s statement as hearsay, plaintiff noted that Boyd was 
unavailable at the time of trial and the statement would fall 
within a hearsay exception and thus could be admitted.5 
At a hearing on the matter, plaintiff stated that a warrant 
was out for Boyd’s arrest and “if the San Jose Police are not going 
to be able to find Mr. Boyd, I think that my investigator is going 
to be very hard put to find . . . ” him as well.6  After the hearing, a 
police sergeant was able to contact Mr. Boyd simply by going to 
 1 Spielbauer v. County of Santa Clara 199 P.3d 1125, 1141 (Cal. 2009). 
 2 Id. at 1128. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
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the house where the ammunition was found.7  Boyd told the 
police officer that he had “recently spoken to ‘a public defender 
investigator.’”8  Plaintiff was confronted with Mr. Boyd’s 
statement and he confessed to speaking with Boyd.9  However, 
plaintiff maintained that any conversation he may have had with 
Boyd was “attorney work product”10 and therefore he was under 
no obligation to disclose the content of the conversation.11  The 
prosecutor argued that plaintiff had purposefully misled the 
court.12  The court did not rule on potential ethical violations, and 
instead ruled that Boyd was in fact an available witness and 
would consider the objection to the admission of Boyd’s 
statement.13 
Some time later, the Chief Assistant Public Defender, David 
Mann, learned of plaintiff’s potential misconduct and that the 
prosecutor in the Dignan case intended “to ‘go after’ [plaintiff] in 
some manner.”14  This meant one of three possibilities: file 
misdemeanor charges against plaintiff, report plaintiff to the 
State Bar, or let the Public Defender’s office take care of the 
plaintiff’s discipline.15  Shortly after learning about the incident, 
Mann launched an internal investigation.  On April 1, 2003 
plaintiff and his attorney appeared for an interview on the 
matter; several department heads were also present, including 
Mann.  During the course of the first interview, plaintiff refused 
to answer any questions.16  Each time the following admonition 
was made to plaintiff: “you have a right to remain silent and not 
incriminate yourself.  Your silence, however, may be deemed 
insubordination, leading to administrative discipline up to and 
including termination.  Any statement made during this interview 
cannot . . . be used against you in any subsequent criminal 
proceeding.”17  In response to the admonition, plaintiff’s attorney 
responded that such an admonition did not apply to public 
defenders and as such any protection from criminal prosecution 
must be administered via a formal court order.18  At a subsequent 
interview on the same matter plaintiff again refused to answer 
certain questions and on June 9, 2003 plaintiff was discharged 
 7 Id. at 1128–29. 
 8 Id. at 1129. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
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for: “(1) insubordination . . . (2) gross misconduct unbecoming a 
county officer, and (3) seeking, in violation of office rules 
governing attorney ethics, to mislead a court by artifice or false 
statement.”19  An administrative hearing upheld the charges and 
the related discipline.20 
Plaintiff sought mandamus relief in the Superior Court, 
arguing that he was improperly dismissed for refusing to answer 
his employer’s questions.21  In addition, plaintiff argued that his 
refusal to answer certain questions was based on his right 
against self-incrimination.22  Finally, plaintiff argued that his 
right against self-incrimination was properly invoked as his 
employer never obtained a formal grant of criminal use 
immunity.23  The Superior Court disagreed and upheld the 
actions of the Public Defender’s Office.24  The court of appeal 
reversed, finding that “a public employee must receive a formal 
grant of criminal use immunity before being required, on pain of 
discipline, to answer potentially incriminating official questions 
about his or her job performance.”25  The California Supreme 
Court granted review. 
Analysis 
Both the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and the California Constitution state that no person shall “‘be 
compelled in a criminal cause to be a witness against 
themselves.’”26  These provisions not only guarantee protection 
from self-incrimination from being forced to testify against 
oneself, but also protects a person from answering questions in 
any other proceeding “civil or criminal, formal or informal”27 
where the person reasonably believes the answers will be 
incriminating in a subsequent criminal case.  Additionally, one 
cannot be forced to choose between their job and asserting the 
privilege.28  Put another way, one cannot be put in a position 
where asserting the privilege will subject them to punishment.29  
The only exception is when the refusal to answer would frustrate 
“legitimate governmental objectives;” in such a situation the use 
 19 Id. at 1130. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 1131 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V. § 3; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15). 
 27 Id. (citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973)). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
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of immunity is proper in order to compel the individual to answer 
the otherwise potentially incriminating questions.30 
This rule has been extended to a public employer’s threat of 
punishment to an employee who refuses to answer potentially 
incriminating questions.  Thus, it is a well-established rule that 
“incriminating answers coerced from a public employee under 
threat of dismissal cannot be used against the employee in a 
criminal proceeding.”31  However, this protection against self-
incrimination does not extend to protect an individual from non-
penal adverse use of incriminating statements.32  Therefore, an 
employee who makes incriminating statements under threat of 
potential employment discipline may still be punished, and even 
terminated so long as the employee’s right to self-incrimination 
in criminal proceedings is protected.33  However, the employee 
cannot be punished simply for invoking his Constitutional right 
against self-incrimination, even with assurances that his 
answers will not be used in criminal proceedings against him.34 
In this case, the plaintiff and the court of appeal used several 
California statutes35 to come to the conclusion that: 
One subjected to coercive official questioning in a noncriminal setting 
is constitutionally privileged to refuse to answer unless personally 
immunized, and, if personal immunity is denied, or is unavailable 
from an authorized source, the person cannot be sanctioned for 
remaining silent, but if one does speak under official compulsion, 
without the protection of formal immunity, the Constitution 
nonetheless prohibits direct or derivative use of the statements in a 
criminal prosecution against the declarant.36 
However, both California cases as well as the Supreme Court 
have held differently.37  Those cases have held time and time 
again that a public employee may, under threat of employment 
sanctions, be compelled to answer potentially incriminating 
questions so long as they are still afforded the protection of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court, in Garrity v. New Jersey,38 and its 
progeny,39 has stated that a public employee cannot be 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. (citing Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 496–97 (1967)). 
 32 Id. (citing Segretti v. State Bar, 15 Cal.3d 878, 886–87 (1973)). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 1133 (citing various California statutes). 
 36 Id. at 1132. 
 37 Id. at 1133–34. 
 38 385 U.S. 493, 496–97 (1967). 
 39 See Gardner v. Broderick 392 U.S. 273 (1968) (discussing a New York police officer 
that was asked to sign a waiver of his Fifth Amendment right and was told that failure to 
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terminated simply for invoking the protection of the Fifth 
Amendment.  However the Court noted that if an employer 
coerces an employee to answer questions that are “specifically, 
directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of their official 
duties on pain of dismissal without requiring relinquishment of 
the benefits of the constitutional privilege”40  the dismissal would 
not be the result of invoking the privilege. 
The court therefore rejected the court of appeal’s reasoning 
that authorized criminal use immunity was necessary before a 
public employee could be coerced into answering potentially 
incriminating statements.41  Thus, within the instant matter, no 
state or federal constitutional provision, nor any case law allowed 
plaintiff to refuse to answer potentially incriminating statements 
until or unless he received criminal use immunity.42 
Holding 
Neither the California Constitution, nor the Federal 
Constitution provide that immunity must granted against 
criminal use before a public employee is forced to answer 
potentially incriminating questions.43  Additionally, a public 
employer may terminate an employee for failure to answer 
questions if the employee’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination in a criminal prosecution is maintained.44 
Legal Significance 
As a result of this decision, the California Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the notion that public employees may be forced to 
answer questions so long as the employee is not required on pain 
of job termination to forfeit his right against self-incrimination in 
a subsequent criminal proceeding. 
do so would lead to his termination); Spevack v. Klein 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (holding that 
an attorney cannot be disbarred solely for refusing to answer questions at a disciplinary 
hearing on the basis of his Fifth Amendment right); Sanitation Men v. Sanitation 
Comm’r. 392 U.S 280 (1968) (discussing employees that were told they would be 
terminated if they invoked their right against self-incrimination in order to avoid 
testifying before the commissioner).  
 40 Spielbauer, 199 P.3d at 1134 (citing Sanitation Men). 
 41 Id. at 1141. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
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